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Abstract 
Georges Canguilhem is known to have regretted, with some pathos, that Life no 
longer serves as an orienting question in our scientific activity. He also 
frequently insisted on a kind of uniqueness of organisms and/or living bodies – 
their inherent normativity, their value-production and overall their inherent 
difference from mere machines. In addition, Canguilhem acknowledged a major 
debt to the German neurologist-theoretician Kurt Goldstein, author most 
famously of The Structure of the Organism in 1934; along with Merleau-Ponty, 
Canguilhem was the main figure who introduced the work of Goldstein and his 
‘phenomenology of embodiment’ into France. In this paper I inquire if we should 
view Canguilhem and Goldstein as ‘biochauvinists’, that is, as thinkers who 
consider that there is something inherently unique about biological entities as 
such, and if so, of what sort. 
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Nous n'avons pas l'outrecuidance de prétendre rénover la médecine en 
lui incorporant une métaphysique  
(Canguilhem 1972, p. 9). 
 
la vie déconcerte la logique 
(Canguilhem 1977, p. 1) 
 
 
In what follows I reflect on the possible contribution of Georges 
Canguilhem (1904-1995) to a discourse in the philosophy of the life sciences 
which would not be content to locate itself squarely within either of two classic 
and enduring orthodoxies: reductionism or holism. Granted, these two 
extremes often coxist, if not very happily, and the different subdisciplines 
approach them in a very different way. As Gayon has noted (Gayon 2010), the 
philosophy of biology as a professional discipline, which primarily focuses on a 
kind of specialized conceptual analysis aiming at clarifying the implications 
and consequences of biological claims in mainstream science, has kept a safe 
distance from what it perceives as ‘vitalism’ throughout its existence as an 
Anglophone genre. This is less true of the philosophy of medicine, inasmuch 
as it focuses more on ‘whole person’ analyses, subjectivity, qualitative 
dimensions of suffering and well-being, and so on (see Giroux 2010 for a 
useful contrast between Canguilhem and analytic philosophy of medicine). 
Canguilhem was a prominent figure in these disciplines, particularly in 
the rather short-lived intellectual formation known as ‘biophilosophy’ (along 
with Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon; Ruyer’s early works are 
contemporary with Canguilhem’s, in the 1940s, while Simondon shares with 
Canguilhem a ‘heyday’ in the 1960s). The latter precisely was the project to 
understand Life, living beings, the concept of organism, and so on, in terms 
not exclusively dictated either by mechanistic science or by the philosophical 
fellow-travellers of such science. The question of whether such a project is 
necessarily ‘vitalistic’ or ‘biochauvinist’ (to use a recent coinage by the 
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biological theorist and embodied-cognition researcher Ezequiel Di Paolo, in Di 
Paolo 2009), and of course, what these terms mean in the present context, 
shall be part of my concern in this essay. 
Canguilhem sometimes described himself as a vitalist – playfully, but 
perhaps not ironically (Canguilhem 1965 and Canguilhem 1977, Preface), and 
one should not forget that in the decades he did so, particularly the 1950s-
1960s, it was at the very least provocative (Geroulanos 2009); there was after 
all no scholarship either on eighteenth-century vitalism (like that of the 
Montpellier School) or on early nineteenth-century German biology (like 
Blumenbach’s embryology), nor of course was there such a thing as ‘theory’ 
and its invocations of vitalism (such as Bennett 2010b). Canguilhem returned 
to the theme several times, and of course in a broader sense if we reflect on 
some of the core arguments of his classic, The Normal and the Pathological, we 
find an implicit presupposition that normativity is a power or capacity proper 
to living beings. This may not be full-blown ‘vitalism’ (whatever that is; see 
Wolfe 2011a and 2011b; Normandin and Wolfe, eds. 2013), but it is an 
insistence that there is something unique about living entities that makes 
them creators of a certain world which they inhabit. 
This should not be taken so much in the sense of classical idealism, for 
which “nothing whatsoever can have a positive relation to the living being if 
the latter is not in its own self the possibility of this relation, i.e. if the relation 
is not determined by the Notion and hence not directly immanent in the 
subject” (Hegel 1817/1970, § 359R, p. 385); it is closer for instance to von 
Uexküll’s sense of Umwelt, according to which “Every subject spins out, like 
the spider's threads, its relations to certain qualities of things and weaves 
them into a solid web, which carries its existence” (von Uexküll 2010, p. 53). 
But we can also detect in this idea of living beings as creators, some 
Nietzschean overtones or arrière-pensées (and of course Foucault pointed to 
this aspect in his mentor’s work, emphasizing that “forming concepts is a way 
of living, not of killing life, of living in complete mobility and not immobilizing 
life” [Foucault 1985/1989, p. 21]): the idea that values, norms and other 
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higher-level constructs are in fact products of our vital instincts. For 
Canguilhem, who was interested in such illustrations of the unpredictability of 
life as monsters, “Man is only truly healthy when he is capable of multiple 
norms, when he is more than normal. The measure of health is a certain 
capacity to overcome organic crises in order to establish a new physiological 
order, different from the initial order. In all seriousness, health is the ability [le 
luxe] to fall ill and then get over it. On the contrary, illness is the reduction of 
the power to overcome other illnesses.”1 
Closer to the present topic, we can also recognize in this idea the 
influence of Kurt Goldstein, who elaborated, in his lengthy and difficult work 
on ‘the structure of the organism’ (Goldstein 1934/1995), a conception of 
organisms as interpretive and indeed meaning-creating beings; beings for 
whom being alive, acting, is, aside from other metabolic processes, also a 
process of the production of meaning. Or, in a more recent restatement of the 
same core idea: “organisms are subjects having purposes according to values 
encountered in the making of their living” (Weber and Varela 2002, p. 102). 
Differently put, the kind of vitalism at work in Goldstein and Canguilhem is 
explicitly not like the vitalism of those people who contemplate little squiggly 
bundles of life (from Trembley’s polyp to Driesch’s sea urchin blastomeres, via 
Réaumur’s frogs which he made to wear little taffetas shorts to catch their 
sperm) and then assert that they have witnessed the difference between Life 
and non-Life: “A vitalist, I would suggest, is someone who is led to reflect on 
the nature of life more because of the contemplation of an egg than because 
she has handled a hoist or a bellows” (Canguilhem 1965a, p. 88). Rather, it is 
a vitalism of meaning and projection. 
Yet Canguilhem (unlike, say, Hans Jonas) is genuinely concerned with 
the nature of biological life, not with some secret way of defending human 
uniqueness over and against the rest of the physical universe. In his major 
collection of essays on the topic, The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas opposes the 
                                                          
1
 “Le normal et le pathologique,” in Canguilhem 1965b, p. 167. See also Canguilhem 1972, pp. 
77, 155. 
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world of conscious organisms to the ‘dead’ world of mechanical Nature and 
insists that “the point of life itself” is “its self-centered individuality,” which he 
insists must be an “ontological concept” (Jonas 1966, p. 79); from the outset, 
he explains that he is interested in biological processes such as metabolism 
inasmuch as they are ultimately indicative of “freedom” (ibid., p. 3; see also 
Kass 1995).2 Indeed, vitalism has often served as a mask or indicator of 
humanism, itself often with theological foundations. That is, claims of an 
oppositional or differential sort, in which ‘Life’, ‘organism’, ‘the animal’ or ‘the 
living body’ are opposed, often in foundationalist ontological terms, to ‘physical 
nature’, ‘mechanical nature’, ‘mechanistic materialism’, ‘the world as machine’ 
and so on, like Carolyn Merchant’s Death of Nature (Merchant 1980; see 
Sutton and Tribble 2011 for an inspiring critique) often in the end have an 
anthropocentric motivation such as defending freedom, as in Jonas’ case 
above, or those thinkers for whom materialism and scientific analysis are 
suitable for “the material universe” but “yield disastrous results when applied 
to the inner, subjective world of human nature, human thought, and human 
emotions” (Hill 1968, p. 90). In contrast, Canguilhem was a naturalist, to use a 
term of art popular from the last decades: he approvingly quotes Spinoza 
asserting that we are parts of Nature and nothing more: we, as humans, or 
rational agents, or possessors of a pineal gland, do not form an imperium in 
imperio (Canguilhem 1965a, p. 95). 
But my question here is, in what way does Canguilhem argue, 
biochauvinistically, for living bodies being special? One of the curious features 
of Goldstein’s account we find again in Canguilhem’s unique way of engaging 
with ‘organisms’ and the question of their uniqueness: the way in which he 
wavers or moves back and forth between a cautious, epistemological position 
(reminiscent of the Kantian regulative ideal in the third Critique) in which 
                                                          
2
 I am not suggesting that Jonas was a panpsychist, but rather that what interests him is not 
Nature per se, but conscious, self-maintaining organisms as such – and then, by extension, a 
system which enables such organisms to exist (thanks to Darian Meacham for demanding this 
clarification). A philosopher familiar with Hegel might recognize here a form of the philosophy 
of nature in which organisms are relevant inasmuch as they are (weak, or provisional) forms of 
subjectivity, and ultimately of Spirit. 
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organisms are real and special because of the way we cognitively constitute 
them, and a bold, ontological position in which organisms are real because of 
basic, intrinsic features which are just there. (I shall not go into the details of 
Goldstein’s account, which sounds more Heideggerian than anything else – for 
example, the claim in his “Concluding Remarks” that “the organism is a being 
enduring in time,” curiously enough “in eternal time, for it does not commence 
with procreation, certainly not with birth, and does not end with death” – 
although to be fair these ‘existential’ motifs crop up in Canguilhem too3.) But if 
we set that aside, Goldstein definitely contributed a new kind of approach 
which was, of course, holistic and organismic while nevertheless operating at a 
primarily heuristic, non-ontological level. As he says, “The Organism consists 
mainly of a detailed description of the new method, the so-called holistic, 
organismic approach. […] We were confronted then with a difficult problem of 
epistemology. The primary aim of my book is to describe this methodological 
procedure in detail, by means of numerous observations” (Goldstein 
1934/1995, p. 18).  
However, this convenient distinction between the epistemological 
(projective, constitutive) vision of biological entities and the ontological vision 
(strong vitalist, ‘rational metaphysics’ as Kant might have said), is somewhat 
muddied when Canguilhem introduces a further vitalist twist: that it might be 
an objective (‘ontological’) feature of living beings (i) that they are interpretive 
beings, à la Goldstein, and especially (ii) that they need to consider other 
entities as themselves organismic, purposive, vital (Canguilhem 1965a). There 
is also an existentialist parfum in Canguilhem’s reflections (a further twist on 
the ontological dimension in [i]), when he describes this interpretive stance as 
essentially a kind of fundamental existential attitude.4 One finds the properly 
biological or biomedical version of this ‘existentialism’ in The Normal and the 
Pathological, with statements such as “the life of a living being . . . only 
                                                          
3
  Goldstein 1934/1995, p. 387.  
4
 For more on the young Canguilhem as a humanist existentialist, a reader of Alain, prior to 
his turn to vitalism, see the precise analysis in Bianco 2013.  
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recognizes the categories of health and illness on the level of experience, which 
is first of all an épreuve in the affective sense of the term – not on the level of 
science” (Canguilhem 1972, p. 131). We should notice here the appeal to a 
founding, subjective, dimension, although it is not clear if this should be 
treated as an ontologically specific region or not. That is, Canguilhem is 
neither listing ‘objective features’ of living beings, like homeostasis, and 
claiming that they are ‘definitory’, nor, conversely, is he opting for a fully 
subjectivist position, where ‘to live’ is understand on the model of, or as 
interrelated with, ‘to know’ as the property of a knowing subject. Is he closer to 
a Hegelian perspective, in which the organism is already a form of subjectivity? 
Again, this is not the place to decide such matters. 
If we try to understand Canguilhem in relation to recent theoretical 
biology (including the ‘organizational’ theories of A. Moreno et al., see Bechtel 
2007, Mossio and Moreno 2010, Moreno and Mossio forthcoming), using as a 
guiding question, ‘are organisms unique in the physical world? If so, why?’, we 
arrive at a curious situation, in which he seems to be both more and less 
committed to the uniqueness of embodied, biomedical entities than other 
theoreticians. On the one hand, Canguilhem appears more cautious, and less 
crypto-dualistic than some prominent recent figures like Varela, who tend to 
fall into the category mistake of seeking to prove the uniqueness of the 
biological by providing some empirical criteria – a ‘laundry list’, as it were, 
which frequently invokes Bernard’s milieu intérieur, Cannon’s notion of 
homeostasis, and more recently the work of Ganti, Luisi et al. on self-
organization and autocatalytic processes (and organizational closure).5 This is 
particularly odd when some of these figures invoke the authority of Kant in the 
Third Critique (as has become very common in this strand of theoretical 
biology, e.g. Weber and Varela 2002; Perret 2012;  Simeonov, Brezina et al. 
                                                          
5
 For a rare acknowledgment of this problem, see Di Paolo 2009, where he criticizes Varela for 
“a hazy view of living systems as being defined by a list of properties (growth, reproduction, 
responsiveness” (p. 14). A nice extension of this point is in Machery 2012 (see especially his 
critical evaluation of those he calls “life definitionists,” who “have constantly mixed folk 
intuitions with scientific considerations,” p. 161). 
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2012). To put it bluntly, to provide an empirical set of criteria for why living 
beings are special and to claim that this fills in a Kantian framework, is not a 
good idea if this framework explicitly rejects the idea of giving empirical 
definitions of organism, inasmuch as Kant’s organism concept is explicitly 
built around his notion of regulative ideal (Kant 1790/1987, § 73, 276; Wolfe 
2010). For Kant, organism is a “reflective” construct rather than a 
“constitutive” feature of reality, and reflective judgments are “incapable of 
justifying any objective assertions” (Kant 1790/1987, § 67, 259; § 73, 277). 
Kurt Goldstein and Canguilhem were, I think, onto something when they 
insisted that rather than say what is unique about the biological, we look to 
the observer: to be an organism is to have a point of view on organisms; one 
which produces intelligibility, which reveals organisms as meaning-producing 
beings (Starobinski 1956, who comments that “comprendre nous met en 
présence d’une totalité signifiante”6). Notice that this approach valorizes a 
constructivist dimension in the definition of life and the relevant individual (like 
the World Health Organization’s notorious definition of health, which is broad 
enough to include all senses of well-being: “Health is a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity”7). That is, there may be biological ‘facts’ or ‘invariants’, but we are 
makers of our worlds. (Who is this ‘we’? Humans? Higher mammals? All living 
creatures? Canguilhem is never very clear how restrictive this concept is: like 
von Uexküll’s Umwelt, could it apply to ticks and woodlice? He sometimes 
grants that “even for an amoeba, living means preference and exclusion,” 
using the same phrase later in the book: “the life of a living entity, even an 
amoeba, only acknowledges the categories of health and sickness on the level 
of experience” (Canguilhem 1972, pp. 84, 131, emphasis mine). But most of 
                                                          
6
 Starobinski 1956, p. 5; the extent to which this includes non-human animals is open to 
discussion. 
7
 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the 
International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) 
and entered into force on 7 April 1948. The definition has not been amended since 1948.  
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the time he is interested in humans as subjective, embodied agents – the 
objects of medical science, caught between biological and social norms. And 
this is why I suggest that he can be called a humanist.) 
But on the other hand, this is not the final answer, or the argument-
stopper: as I mentioned above, Canguilhem is also more biocentric or 
biochauvinistic than many of his contemporaries. This appears more clearly if 
we contrast Canguilhem with the fairly ‘disembodied’ character of much of 
recent theoretical biology: in contrast, he wants to be a kind of vitalist. To be 
sure, Canguilhem is not the sort of thinker who seeks to discover ‘organismic 
laws’ (like Elsasser 1961), lays out a laundry list of ontologically unique 
features, or most crudely, propounds a metaphysics of entelechies, like Hans 
Driesch, who converted his Chair in biology into one in philosophy in order to 
reinvent a jejune Aristotelianism based on his earlier experimental work in 
Entwicklungsmechanik (which Erik Peterson has described, fittingly, as 
‘bioexceptionalism’ [Peterson 2012, 2013]: an empire within an empire or 
‘kingdom within a kingdom, as it were): a metaphysics of the sea urchin. 
To be more precise, Driesch, who came out of the school of Wilhelm 
Roux’s Entwicklungsmechanik (or study of the mechanisms of the 
developmental process), performed successful, and much-discussed 
experiments with sea urchin eggs, halving the two blastomeres (daughter cells) 
of the egg and successfully producing two whole embryos and larvae, complete 
in every respect. This total equality of the halved eggs he termed their 
“totipotency,” and the cells derived from the egg he termed a harmonious 
equipotential system (Driesch 1914, p. 209). Faced with the evidence that 
there was no physical structure we can find in the sea urchin embryo which is 
responsible for the “regulative” or “equipotential,” force, he felt obliged to posit 
a vital force, the entelechy.8 Tellingly, Driesch became so absorbed with this 
                                                          
8 I note that Bergson (who was sometimes wrongly associated with Driesch under the banner of vitalism 
in the early twentieth century), attacked this claim of a life-force in all living organisms explicitly. 
Bergson asked: where is this force? at what level? He expressed doubts that nature could be interpreted 
strictly in terms of this internal “finality”( Wolsky & Wolsky 1992, p. 156f.) 
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feature that he gave up experimental work to teach philosophy at the 
University of Leipzig, developing a form of vitalism, as he called it, focusing on 
the idea that entelechies exist in all living organisms. The choice of term was 
deliberate, for he believed one had to revive a vitalist thinking which had lain 
dormant since Aristotle (the Montpellier school does not appear in his 
historical surveys). Canguilhem comments on Driesch’s ‘shift’ from science to 
metaphysics as follows: 
The vitalist biologist who turns philosopher of biology  thinks he brings 
a certain capital with him to philosophy, but in reality he  brings to it 
only a land-income [rentes], which continually decreases in the  market 
of scientific values – for the simple reason that research, in which he  no 
longer participates, continues to move forward. Such is the case with  
Driesch’s abandonment of scientific research for philosophical 
speculation and even teaching. What we have here is an unpremeditated 
abuse of confidence. The prestige of scientific work stems above all from 
its internal  dynamism. The former scientist sees himself deprived of tills 
prestige in the  eyes of active scientists. He believes he will preserve it 
among the philosophers. This must not be so. Philosophy, being an 
autonomous enterprise of  reflection, does not honor any prestige at all, 
not even that of the scientist,  or – even more rightly – that of the ex-
scientist (Canguilhem 1965a, p. 94; I have used the translation in 
Canguilhem 2008a, pp. 68-69). 
Canguilhem is not a metaphysician of entelechies, then; nor is he a 
quasi-religious defender of the sovereignty of organic life like Hans Jonas or 
his more simplistic disciple Leon Kass (Kass 1995); nor a defender of 
philosophical anthropology like Helmuth Plessner (here I refer back to my 
comment regarding the hidden or overt foundationalism in such forms of 
vitalism). In some respects, particularly in his 1966 essay “Le concept et la 
vie,” which begins with a long reflection on Aristotle, he seems closer to 
Marjorie Grene and her attempt to return to Aristotelian teleology (Grene 1968, 
1974; Grene herself wrote favorably about Canguilhem: Grene 2000). Unlike 
many of these thinkers, as well as phenomenologists of embodiment, 
Canguilhem has no appeal to a Romantic subjectivity, e.g. in the sense 
described (critically) by Jean-Marie Schaeffer: “In phenomenology, the 
understanding of embodiment (corporéité) is part of an approach that 
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continues to accept the epistemic privilege of consciousness’s self-investigation 
as axiomatic” or (affirmatively) by the enactivist theorist Evan Thompson: “Life 
realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood and sense-making.”9 In 
explicit contrast to Varela and most of the above-mentioned thinkers (with the 
exception of Grene), Canguilhem does not have any problems with Darwinian 
evolution (Canguilhem 1972, p. 90; Méthot 2013), and indeed is not engaged 
in the project of ‘refounding’, ‘regrounding’ or otherwise reinventing a new 
program for science (with occasional, late exceptions which display a more 
reactive attitude towards the march of science, such as his remarks against 
some of psychology, cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience in the essay 
“Le Cerveau et la Pensée” [Canguilhem 1980/1992], which themselves extend 
criticisms already articulated in Canguilhem 1958/2002). But is he still a 
‘biochauvinist’, claiming that there is a special “biological space and time”? 
All of this is really quite ‘dialectical’, in the sense of being slippery, and 
almost circular – but in a productive sense. Namely, when a prominent figure 
like Andy Clark, who pushed cognitive science to take embodiment much more 
seriously in a variety of publications at least since Being There (Clark 1997), 
has to warn about the mysticism of “pressing the flesh” (Clark 2008), he is 
effectively stepping back from twenty years’ worth of emphasis on what is 
unique about embodiment. When Di Paolo warns against the naïveté of 
“biochauvinism,” ten pages later he speaks approvingly of another theorist 
(Michael Wheeler)’s concept of “vital materiality” (Di Paolo 2009, p. 20, 
referring to Wheeler 2010 [the paper had been available for some years 
earlier]). Wheeler had used this term in opposition to what he calls 
implementational materiality. Vital materiality is meant to convey the sense of 
the necessarily biological features of certain types of organization. 
Similarly, just when Canguilhem has finished warning the reader about 
the intellectual dangers inherent in positing that living beings are like an 
empire within an empire (imperium in imperio, Canguilhem 1965a, p. 95), he 
                                                          
9
 Schaeffer 2007, p. 118; Thompson 2007, p. 238. Thompson often refers to ‘sense-making’ as 
a distinctive feature of enaction, in autopoietic systems (e.g. p. 139). 
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will then assert – as he does at length in “Le concept et la vie,” that it is Life 
itself – written with a very capital L, that determines livings beings to act in 
these interpretive, purposive, normative, vital ways. Life “disconcerts logic” 
(Canguilhem 1977, p. 1). In a lecture in the problem of regulations in the 
organism and society, he says that  
An organism is an entirely exceptional mode of being, because there is 
no real difference, properly speaking, between its existence and the rule 
or norm of its existence. From the time an organism exists, is alive, that 
organism is ‘possible’, i.e., it fulfills the ideal of an organism; the norm 
or rule of its being [existence] is given by its existence itself (Canguilhem 
2002, pp. 106-107). 
An “entirely exceptional mode of being” sounds like ontological specificity. 
He states what I loosely called the dialectical slipperiness of the relation 
between Life itself and the thinker’s vitalism more sharply in The Normal and 
the Pathological itself: “It is life itself, in its differentiation between its 
propulsive behavior and its repulsive behavior, which introduces the 
categories of health and illness into human consciousness. These categories 
are biologically technical and subjective, not biologically scientific and 
objective” (Canguilhem 1972, p. 150). Notice here the subjectivism – the 
appeal to a foundational subjectivity – which I had earlier connected to a 
particularly anti-naturalistic trend in phenomenology, and the more recent 
theory known as enactivism, associated with Varela in particular, which often 
asserts that life is lived ‘outside of the physical’: “Life is not physical in the 
standard materialist sense of purely external structure and function … [w]e 
accordingly need an expanded notion of the physical to account for the 
organism or living being” (Thompson 2007, p. 238). Indeed, Canguilhem 
himself, sounding less careful than usual, will sometimes say that “In short, it 
is impossible for the objectivity of medical knowledge to cancel out (annuler) 
the subjectivity of the lived experience of the patient” (Canguilhem 1978/2002, 
p. 409; this essay was added to the later edition of this book). Yet the 
subjectivity at issue is, to be fair, never disembodied, never some pure ego 
contemplating the reality of the flesh like a sailor in a ship. Where Canguilhem 
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differs sharply from the phenomenology of embodiment is that the latter is 
permanently tempted by a foundationalist distinction between Leib as 
interiority and Körper as exteriority (as Schaeffer notes in the passage cited 
above). From Merleau-Ponty to Varela and Thompson, such thinkers maintain 
that the lived body (which really is the body in their discourse) exists at least 
in part “outside of physical space” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, p. 209). Thus the 
living body – indeed, any organism – “is an individual in a sense which is not 
that of modern physics” (ibid., p. 154). 
Now, Canguilhem is in his own way, a thinker of embodiment, which I 
have noted in contrasting his view with both Driesch’s (neo-)vitalism and 
Jonas’s metaphysics of organism. But he has no need for these additional 
commitments to a “non-physical” dimension of Life. Indeed, I don’t think 
Canguilhem, the medical doctor, would ever go as far as Deleuze and speak of 
a vitalism of the inorganic, a “powerful non-organic life,”10 or, as contemporary 
theorists might, of “a vitality intrinsic to materiality as such,” wherein the 
author recommends “detach[ing] materiality from the figures of passive, 
mechanistic, or divinely infused substance” (Bennett 2010a, p. xiii). Life is too 
central for him – not life-forces or entelechies, not cosmic or impersonal life, 
but the life of embodied agents. Similarly, the particularly medical emphasis in 
his vitalism (manifest in his focus on Bichat and related figures), which can be 
conveyed in the basic claim that all living beings die and get sick, with the 
implied, irreducibly axiological dimension, distinguishes it from forms of 
vitalism predicated on embryology and its mysteries: “the patient is a Subject” 
(with a capital S, Canguilhem 1978/2002, p. 409; for more on Canguilhem on 
values and subjectivity, see Sholl, ms.). That is, a philosophical reflection on 
health and sickness, on the ‘normativity’ of the organism and its experience 
(Goldstein-Canguilhem) is at some distance from a reflection on the egg, its 
                                                          
10
 Deleuze 1993, p. 164 (“La vitalité non-organique est le rapport du corps à des forces ou 
puissances imperceptibles qui s’en emparent ou dont il s’empare”), and Deleuze and Guattari 
1991, p. 172. In Francis Bacon, Logique de la sensation, the phrase “la vitalité non organique 
d'un corps sans organe” is partly credited to Wörringer and opposed to the phenomenological 
unity of the body (Deleuze 1981/2002, p. 31). 
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potential and the metaphysics one can derive from it. Of course, not all 
scientific and theoretical reflections on the uniqueness of developmental 
systems need to appeal to a metaphysical uniqueness of life, even at their 
most holistic, organismic moments (Oyama 2010), and similarly, there is 
nothing inherently false about focusing on the unique features of biological 
systems, whether of the homeostatic sort (Bernard, Cannon, Luisi, Turner), 
the developmental (Oyama) or of the ecologically systemic sort (Odling-Smee).11 
Conversely, and despite their shared affinity for Goldstein, it is more 
than unlikely that Canguilhem would verse into Catholic mysticism of the 
flesh, as Merleau-Ponty does in the Phenomenology of Perception: “Just as the 
sacrament not only symbolizes […] an operation of Grace, but is also the real 
presence of God […] in the same way the sensible has not only a motor and 
vital significance but is a way of being in the world […] sensation is literally a 
form of communion.”12 I think Canguilhem’s advocating of a core Spinozist 
tenet (we are all parts of Nature, there is no kingdom within a kingdom), his 
Nietzschean position with regard to life as the production of value(s), and his 
Darwinian recognition of the role of chance and evolution, to name three basic 
features of his thought, put him at odds with the above doctrine. This is so, 
even if, commenting in fact on Merleau-Ponty in a late lecture on Health, 
Canguilhem reflects with what I think to be a hint of distance, regret or irony 
on the limitations of a conceptualization of the living body as “inaccessible to 
others, accessible only to its titular holder” (2008b, p. 476); that is, he has 
                                                          
11
 For some philosophical discussion of these various recent models in biology, see 
Barberousse, Morange & Pradeu, eds., 2009 and Normandin and Wolfe, eds. 2013.  
12
 Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 212. Novalis already identified the experience and conceptual 
paradoxes of the sense of touch with “the mystery of transubstantiation” (Novalis 1798/1987, 
p. 622). This fascination with the flesh as somehow apart from the physical world is present, 
prior to Merleau-Ponty, in the Husserl of Ideas II, and later, in Didier Anzieu and his notion of 
the ‘Moi-Peau’, and Jean-Luc Nancy, with his ‘secularized Christian’ fascination with 
embodiment qua incarnation. They seem to repeat verbatim the powerful mystical utterances 
concerning a body beyond this world, of figures such as the twelfth-century nun Hildegard of 
Bingen and the thirteenth-century Flemish poet and Beguine, Hadewijch (Dailey 2011). 
Granted, it is possible to derive other positions from Merleau-Ponty, notably in his earlier work 
The Structure of Behavior. 
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referred to “commentator after commentator” who ascribes superiority to what 
is given as such, acknowledging the existence of a side of the living body that 
is “inaccessible to others, accessible only to its titular holder” (ibid.). 
 This sense of privacy, of inaccessible interiority, is a crucial feature of 
many defenses of what organisms are and how they are different from 
machines: Leibniz for instance, for whom they differ from ordinary machines 
in possessing a “deeper source”13; or perhaps Kant when he stated rather 
confidently, and influentially, that “there will never be a Newton of a blade of 
grass” in the third Critique of 1790, having already claimed in the so-called 
‘pre-critical’ Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens of 1755 that 
“we will sooner understand the formation of all celestial bodies, the cause of 
their motions, in short, the origin of the entire present arrangement of the 
world-edifice, than we will come to know distinctly or completely the 
production of a single herb or of a caterpillar from mechanical grounds.”14 This 
is what Schaeffer meant in the passage I cited above, when he refers to the 
understanding of embodiment that holds as foundational the “epistemic 
privilege” of a self-aware consciousness (Schaeffer 2007, p. 118). Of course, 
not all claims that organisms are categorically different from machines amount 
to defining this difference in terms of a deeper interiority or selfhood. But 
increasingly, from the late eighteenth century onwards, and into twentieth-
century phenomenology (and its embodied variants), the emphasis is on the 
latter, as is also manifest in Varela’s insistence in his last essays on a ‘first-
person science’ (Varela and Shear eds., 1999). We might say that the extent to 
which Canguilhem is committed or not, to the presence of a foundational 
                                                          
13
 Letter to Hoffmann of September 17, 1699, in Hoffmann 1749, I, pp. 49a-b; cf. De ipsa 
natura (1698), § 3, GP IV, p. 505; Leibniz 1969, p. 95. 
14
 Kant 1987, § 75, pp. 282-283; Kant 1755, Ak 1, p. 230. For a nice discussion which makes 
Canguilhem a phenomenologist see Gérard 2010; for an equally compelling reading which 
seeks to distance Canguilhem from phenomenology, see Sholl 2012 and especially Sholl (ms.). 
I am closer to Sholl’s interpretation – and Canguilhem’s rather pointed barbs at the expense of 
Husserl and in favour of Foucault (e.g. in Canguilhem 1967), should be taken into account 
here – but it must be recognized that there are elements in Canguilhem which lend themselves 
to Gérard’s reading. 
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subjectivity either ‘in the body’ or as an irreducible feature ‘of the body’, is the 
extent to which he is a phenomenologist. On this issue – which recent 
scholarship has treated less than univocally –  
Canguilhem was a self-proclaimed vitalist (although with a degree of 
irony), a ‘biochauvinist’ in the sense that as a thinker of the normal and the 
pathological, of a ‘knowledge of life’, as a disciple of Goldstein, he is one of the 
main figures of what was known as ‘biophilosophy’ in the mid-twentieth 
century – a project which differs from present philosophy of biology in a variety 
of ways (Gayon 2010), notably, that biophilosophy feels that philosophy, 
sometimes even metaphysics, can dictate its conditions to biology, since living 
beings have features (value? purposiveness? consciousness?) that remain 
inaccessible to quantitative science. In contrast, the philosophy of biology is 
very much a project engaged in conceptual clarification of ‘emerged’ science, 
which it does not challenge. However, even qua biophilosopher, it bears noting 
that Canguilhem lacks the hostility to evolutionary thought found e.g. in 
Goldstein and Varela, just as he lacks the potentially reactionary appeal to 
return to a lost Aristotelian world (as in Jonas and Grene). 
Some biophilosophers stand at a greater distance from mainstream 
science than others. Goldstein, sounding quite close to the ideas Canguilhem 
was to make famous in The Normal and the Pathological, holds that “an 
organism that actualizes its essential peculiarities or – which means the same 
thing – meets its adequate environment and the tasks arising from it, is 
‘normal’” (Goldstein 1934/1995, p. 325). Perhaps unconsciously paraphrasing 
Goldstein, Jonas in a late piece describes organisms as  “things whose 
existence is their own achievement. That means that they only exist because of 
what they are doing,” which he then explains as “their activity as such is their 
being” (Jonas 1992, p. 82). While this is not in line with mainstream biology 
(whether molecular, evolutionary, developmental, etc.), it is not explicitly anti-
naturalist; and it is also a weak form of biochauvinism, in that it is less a 
substance (a set of empirical features), and more a function or activity which is 
being invoked as uniquely organismic. In contrast, Raymond Ruyer’s 
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insistence on how the organism transcends the spatial realm, maintaining 
itself through time due to its “potential,” which does not itself belong to the 
space-time world, is more of a revisionary metaphysics. For Ruyer, organisms 
possess a unity beyond spatial categories; they are fundamentally historical in 
character (Ruyer 1946, pp. 8, 14, 27, 58, 94). Ruyer appears to be afraid of a 
universe composed of inanimate matter, with shocks and displacements 
explainable exhaustively by the laws of mechanics – a universe in which the 
organism is no longer anything more than a machine: “If you are shocked by 
what amounts to a generalized ‘theory of organism’, . . . you had better see 
clearly that the choice is between this theory and that of a ‘generalized 
molecule’” (Ruyer 1952, p. 166). 
I have tried to distinguish between a series of views, not identical with 
one another, in which a valuative term variously called ‘the organism’, ‘the 
(lived) body’, ‘Life’ and so on, is presented in special in different ways, and 
usually opposed to the rest of physical nature. While Canguilhem shares the 
intuition that an organism is always ‘actualizing a potential’, in a dynamic 
relation between a plurality of norms and an environment which is made ‘one’s 
own’ (an Umwelt), he does not oppose modern biology, and is certainly not 
seeking to “reintroduce the subject into biology,” unlike Varela (Weber and 
Varela 2002, p. 117). He is arguing from properties of existing biological 
entities – sometimes cells, sometimes monsters or environments, but most 
often persons, whether considered as agents or as patients. As he says in the 
Introduction to the Normal and the Pathological, he is not so presumptuous as 
to claim that he could renew medicine by incorporating a metaphysics into it 
(Canguilhem 1972, p. 9). I have not tried here to articulate a ‘Canguilhemian 
philosophy of medicine’ (some have: Trnka 2003); doubtless it would resemble 
in some important ways, reflection on the importance of a ‘patient-centred’ 
medicine, and would pay close attention to the Goldsteinian and 
Canguilhemian focus on how the organism (or person, or patient) is a creator 
of norms (of stability, of health, of survival and so on), in a partly 
constructivist sense. Yet if we wish to take Canguilhem seriously, some of the 
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metaphysics, the biochauvinism, the existential dimension in his thought take 
us beyond the practical concerns of an empirically focused philosophy of 
medicine. 
Perhaps we should distinguish between three basic claims: strong 
vitalism, with a metaphysical foundation; biochauvinism, which is more of a 
‘spontaneous scientific form’ of vitalism, stripped of all or most of its 
metaphysical commitments but definitely tending towards a holistic, 
organismic perspective; and Canguilhem’s view, which of course he never 
names, enjoying as he does the play of aporias and the mask of the scholar. 
We could speak of a non-metaphysical vitalism, or a ‘naturalized vitalism’15 – 
but then we run into difficulties in accounting for the passages where he 
speaks of an irreducible, experiential dimension of life; we could say that to 
the biochauvinistic claims of theoretical biology, he adds an existential 
dimension. Yet Canguilhem doesn’t seem to succumb to the temptation of a 
bottomless interiority, inwardness or privacy and its concomitant 
transcendence. Somewhere in between the cold appeal of the inorganic, and 
the (hot?) mesmerism of transubstantiation – at some distance, then, from the 
fascination with a kind of transcendence of the flesh found in Merleau-Ponty, 
Varela or Thompson, where biochauvinism verges on the mystery of 
transubstantiation – Canguilhem’s vitalism, his biochauvinism, his quirky 
appeals to the “truth of my body” (2008b, p. 475) if not his residual 
existentialism may hold some lessons for present-day thinking about 
embodiment, neither obsessively reductionist, nor whimsically holist. 
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